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Abstract
Sam Harris, one of the new atheists, believes that science is an authority in moral issues. Science 
can help us understand what our moral duties are, and what is right and wrong in a moral sense. 
However, the cultural and historical diversity of human behaviours, especially the history of wars 
and conflicts, suggests that it is difficult to show one, common and universal kind of morality. Here 
we show that Harris’s moral theory is a particular project which could not be “scientifically” justifi-
able. 
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Science, especially biology, on the one hand offers important materials for philosophi-
cal reflections about morality, ethics and religion. On the other hand, it provides new 
tools for their study (neurobiology, evolution). Sam Harris, one of the new atheists, 
believes that science explains all moral topics. However, scientific research referring to 
morality may be interpreted ambiguously. Look at two cases. In the 17 October 2014 
issue of Science, Sarah F. Brosnan and Frans B.M. de Waal showed that “the sense of 
fairness did not evolve for the sake of fairness per se but in order to reap the benefits 
of continued cooperation.”1 In the next issue of the journal (24 October 2014), we can 
read that “in the course of evolution, some animals have overcome the fear and stress 
they feel when encountering humans or unfamiliar members of their own species and 
become less aggressive.”2 In this article I show that the moral optimism characteristic 
1 S.F. Brosnan, F.B.M. de Waal, Evolution of Responses to (Un)fairness, “Science” 2014, vol. 346, 
no. 6207, doi:10.1126/science.1251776 [accessed: 20.10.2014].
2 A. Gibbons, How We Tamed Ourselves – and Became Modern, “Science” 2014, vol. 346, no. 6208, 
p. 405.
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of Harris is not justifiable, and science cannot offer an unequivocal answer to moral 
questions. However, while this question of the is/ought distinction is well-known in 
the history of philosophy, it is important to underline that it continues to apply today, 
independently of scientific progress (in the case of Harris, especially of neurological 
research). This paper is a kind of polemical response to Harris’s moral theory. I do 
not refer to Harris’s critique of religion, which does not include the recent research 
in the cognitive science of religion, especially Scott Atran’s research on the complex 
impact of religious beliefs on both prosocial cooperation (“ingroup trust”) and conflict 
situations.3 Harris’s approach assumes an ideal situation of simple consequentialism 
between religious beliefs and practical effects.4 I think that, following the response of 
Atran, we can deem Harris’s critique of religion to be debunked.5
According to Sam Harris, science can explain and show our moral duties. It can 
guarantee achievement of the best possible life. Harris thinks that there are right and 
wrong answers to moral questions, like in physics or biology. He argues that uni-
versal morality can be defined with “reference to the negative end of the spectrum 
of conscious experience,” which he calls “the worst possible misery for everyone.”6 
Harris writes: 
As it is possible for individuals and groups to be wrong about how best to maintain their physi-
cal health, it is possible for them to be wrong about how to maximize their personal and social 
well-being.7 
This is a good example not of the impact of science, but of logical erroneous infer-
ence. Nature and knowledge about one element does not provide knowledge about 
another one. 
Harris calls his moral theory “moral realism” (“moral claims can really be true or 
false”) and “consequentialism” (“the rightness of an act depends on how it impacts 
the well-being of conscious creatures”).8 Religious morality and the religious kind of 
reasoning are rather connected with deontologism than consequentialism.9 Despite 
his realism, he sees an incompatibility between particular notions of happiness. He 
quotes Patricia Churchland: 
No one has the slightest idea how to compare the mild headache of five million against the bro-
ken legs of two, or the needs of one’s own two children against the needs of a hundred unrelated 
brain-damaged children in Serbia.10 
3 S. Atran, J. Ginges, Religious and Sacred Imperatives in Human Conflict, “Science” 2012, vol. 336, 
no. 6083, pp. 855–857.
4 S. Harris, The End of Faith. Religion, Terror and the Future of Reason, New York–London 2004, 
p. 12.
5 S. Atran, Here He Goes Again: Sam Harris’s Falsehoods, http://www.thisviewoflife.com/index.
php/magazine/articles/here-he-goes-again-sam-harriss-falsehoods [access: 01.11.2014].
6 S. Harris, The Moral Landscape. How Science Can Determine Human Values, New York 2010, p. 39.
7 Ibidem, p. 62.
8 Ibidem.
9 J. Piazza, P. Sousa, Religiosity, Political Orientation, and Consequentialist Moral Thinking, “Social 
Psychological and Personality Science” 2014, no. 5(3), p. 15.
10 S. Harris, The Moral Landscape..., p. 68.
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It seems better, in this context, to define moral values in terms of other moral 
obligations, not in terms of facts about the world. Harris’s criterion of morality, es-
pecially “the problem of demarcation between the moral and non-moral spheres,”11 
is the concept of welfare.12 For him, nature is not morally neutral, and science can 
discover moral good and evil. 
Harris dogmatically defends moral realism (moral truth)13 independently of the 
philosophical deconstruction made by Immanuel Kant.14 Kant showed that basic phil-
osophical questions (the existence of God or of free will) may be the same – true and 
false – and we cannot justify any of them.15 We can assume their truth, but that is 
a regulative, not constitutive idea. In Europe, before Kant’s critique of metaphysics, 
came the collapse of the Church monopoly. This collapse abolished the homogeneity 
of the scientific kind of interpretation of the world and initiated many kinds of philo-
sophical and scientific explanations.16 The main question is, referring to rejection of 
dogmatism, the conviction of the self-supporting morality. I think that, philosophi-
cally speaking, it is impossible to justify this kind of morality.17 We are able to accept 
the sceptical Kantian paradigm in regard to metaphysical and epistemological issues, 
but much less to apply the same scepticism to questions of morality and values. Simi-
larly, we can say about moral scepticism or neutralism:
Morality ceases to have any definite content, and there can be no meaningful distinction be-
tween correct and mistaken use of moral predicates, as long as they are sincerely used. Any type 
of action or a state of affairs with any set of objective features can become morally relevant 
through the performative process of endorsement.18 
Harris’s moral theory is based on the assumption that desire of happiness and 
welfare is common and universal and should be the basis for morality. I think that this 
noble project is the result of good intentions and is one of the various moral theories, 
especially incompatible with history of wars and conflicts. 
Harris represents the conviction, typical of both Christianity and the Enlighten-
ment, of the universal nature of morality. Possible universal features connected with 
our psycho-physical groundwork, especially concepts of suffering and happiness, 
cannot justify objective morality. We cannot accept these human states as an ethi-
cal basis, as Harris would,19 because we can refer to other values (life, freedom) for 
which it is sometimes necessary to suffer. Happiness and suffering are too individual 
11 A.G. Zavaliy, Saving Morality: A Case against Moral Neutralism, “Studia Humana” 2012, vol.1/2, 
p. 40.
12 Harris presents some kind of utilitarian perspective which is against hedonic tradition. 
13 S. Harris, The Moral Landscape..., p. 62.
14 Ibidem.
15 However, Kant may be interpreted as a moral realist, I mean by this his scepticism referring to true 
knowledge about external reality.
16 K. Mannheim, Ideologia i utopia [Ideology and Utopia], transl. J. Miziński, Lublin 1992, p. 10. 
17 T. van den Beld, The Morality System with and without God, “Ethical Theory and Moral Practice” 
2001, vol. 4, no. 4, p. 386.
18 A.G. Zavaliy, op.cit., p. 41.
19 S. Harris, The End of Faith..., p. 185.
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and not objectively measurable enough to be able to serve as the basis for objective 
morality. The religious alternative is offered by William Lane Craig20 or Kerry Wal-
ters, who claim that without God any basis for morality vanishes.21 We need some 
arbitrary idea or phenomenon, secular or religious, to create so-called objective mo-
rality (rather belief about morality than morality itself). A good example is Atran’s 
study of the morally inspiring role played by “sacred values.”22 
Why should we identify morality with welfare, virtues and pleasure?23 We can say 
that morality should be referred to other aims, and a unique criterion could be only 
our conscience. In this approach, to do something morally means to be consistent with 
own conscience. Harris believes that every man should be good to others. Consider 
the behaviours of chimpanzees, which often use lethal aggression to achieve particular 
aims, and such behaviour has an adaptive nature.24 Look too at the research of Atran, 
who showed that “people making judgments about whether to oppose or to support war 
use the logic of deontology rather than the logic of instrumental rationality.”25 Atran 
points to the compatibility between “ingroup altruism” and “intergroup violence.”26 In 
this context, Harris’s belief that moral norms are connected with facts seems incompat-
ible with the complexity of human perspective, which includes not only happiness and 
suffering but also ideas, ambitions and other nonmaterial, “sacred” values. 
Morality refers to individual conscience and depends on the emotional state 
shaped by personality, nature, tendencies, circumstances, and conditions. We can 
violate others’ moral norms (moral convictions), but if our action is compatible with 
our morality and incompatible with ethics, we violate only ethics, not our morality. In 
the public sphere, a “common” base is conventional ethics, which usually cannot be 
congruent with all individual moralities. Ethics in some sense is based on some kind 
of interpretation of morality, but is subordinated to some group interests, not to indi-
vidual conscience. We could prefer, in the same way, to destroy the life and welfare 
of another or take satisfaction from cruelty, which was an important part of the Euro-
pean culture in the context of public executions and of the mistreatment of children, 
servants, patients or prisoners, and the cruel nature of punishments.27
We can evaluate human behaviours by referring to particular ethical systems, such 
as the Bible, the state constitution, the penal code, the Universal Declaration of Hu-
20 W.L. Craig, Five Reasons God Exists [in:] W.L. Craig, W. Sinnott-Armstrong, God? A Debate 
between a Christian and an Atheist, Oxford 2004, pp. 17–18.
21 K. Walters, Guides for the Perplexed: Atheism, London 2010, p. 136.
22 S. Atran, J. Ginges, Religious and Sacred Imperatives...
23 S. Harris, The Moral Landscape..., p. 68.
24 J.B. Silk, Animal Behaviour: The Evolutionary Roots of Lethal Conflict, “Nature” 2014, no. 513, 
pp. 321–322; M.L. Wilson et al., Lethal Aggression in Pan is Better Explained by Adaptive Strategies 
than Human Impacts, “Nature” 2014, vol. 513, pp. 414–417.
25 J. Ginges, S. Atran, War as a Moral Imperative (Not Just Practical Politics by Other Means), 
“Proceedings of the Royal Society. Biological Sciences,” http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/
early/2011/02/08/rspb.2010.2384, doi:10.1098/rspb.2010.2384 [accessed: 18.10.2014].
26 Ibidem.
27 F. Nietzsche, Z genealogii moralności [The Genealogy of Morals], transl. G. Sowinski, Kraków 
1997, pp. 72–73.
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man Rights or the code of Hammurabi. We cannot say which human behaviour is 
good or bad itself in a moral sense. We may compare some behaviours and actions 
and refer them to particular ethical standards. We can claim that it would be better if 
people were good and compassionate to others. Harris mistakenly compares the sci-
entific search for morality with medicine, biology or physics.28 These disciplines seek 
to describe some parts of the world and to show facts. Morality says what ought to be 
on the basis of various, often mutually contradictory human actions. That is difficult 
to derive moral norms from observed facts. If we derive some norms we create a par-
ticular ethical system useful for some aims, but we do not create and do not uncover 
universal moral norms that are obligatory for all people. 
Morality is a phenomenon compatible with the private conscience, which the-
oretically refers to the whole human species, at least as a philosophical postulate. 
Morality may exist without any ethical systems, as believed, for instance, by Pierre 
Abelard: ethics has social and political functions, and should concern one universal 
morality which is the basis for all ethical norms.29 Harris does not distinguish be-
tween morality and ethics.30 Something moral theoretically should be always good 
or bad, and something ethical has a specific nature. This distinction is significant in 
the discussion on religion, which to today is considered one of the basic sources of 
morality. Harris is not right that people share a similar “ethical insight.”31 We have 
many various ethical systems, also contradictory. In the American public ethics, the 
death penalty is accepted, but not in the European public ethics. Ethics is a kind of 
aesthetics of public life, which specifies what does and what does not correspond 
with a particular imagination of the public order. Ethics is relative, and depends on 
particular interests and aims. We can call this social and political utility of ethics an 
“aesthetic” activity which serves to eliminate all actually phenomena or states of af-
fairs that are “ugly” for some society. Morality may be understood as universal and 
common to all mankind, independently of the dominant “aesthetic” kind of ethics 
which serves to organise society.
I think that we cannot justify the common nature of values, despite their social 
utility. We can postulate the leading importance of values of life or freedom, but 
this approach may be equally justifiable as the primacy of power, as underlined by 
Friedrich Nietzsche in The Genealogy of Morals. Since 1948, we have based West-
ern civilisation on the concept of human rights, but three years earlier the US army 
used nuclear bombs against other people. This example shows the nature of ethics 
which is subordinated to some aims and interests. It is not important, according to 
Harris, whether an attitude has a religious or irreligious motivation. The background 
is a person’s point of view, psychophysical condition and political, social, psycho-
logical or economical aims, for which one may sometimes use the nuclear bomb, but 
sometimes may be merciful and compassionate. We can say that the Holocaust was 
28 S. Harris, The Moral Landscape..., pp. 36–37.
29 P. Abelard, Rozmowa pomiędzy filozofem, Żydem i chrześcijaninem [A Dialogue of a Philosopher 
with a Jew and a Christian] [in:] P. Abelard, Rozprawy, transl. L. Joachimowicz, Warszawa 2001, p. 51.
30 S. Harris, Letter to a Christian Nation..., p. 14, 16; S. Harris, The Moral Landscape..., p. 56.
31 S. Harris, The End of Faith..., p. 45.
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ethical within Nazi ethics, just as the use of nuclear bombs was ethical in American 
war ethics and the burning of heretics was ethical in the ethics of the Church, which 
wanted to defend Church order, that is some kind of public aesthetics. We usually 
evaluate these three acts as morally wrong, and probably we refer to some kind of 
intuitive, natural morality which is not universal for all people – or at least was not 
universal for the Nazis, for Americans when they used nuclear bombs and for Church 
figures who persecuted others for their beliefs. So-called right moral beliefs are not 
common for all people who decide to make so-called morally wrong acts. 
Harris believes that the basic human obligation is to avoid the worst misery for 
others.32 I prefer the approach of Craig, who underlines that the idea of authority is 
a unique and necessary base for the concepts of obligation and prohibition.33 For 
Harris, human happiness is the main criterion of morality. We can evaluate the moral 
nature of actions regarding the happiness of their agents. We could therefore justify 
actions forbidden by public law because they have caused the happiness of their 
agents. In judicial practice, accepted as morally good are the same behaviours which 
are criticised as morally wrong if they are made by persons outside the law. 
Perhaps we should admit that morality understood as universal human tendencies 
evaluated as good or bad does not exist? Maybe we are morally neutral, just as nature 
is neutral? Are various concepts of religious ethics, similarly to state, professional or 
other types of ethics, forms of aesthetic of our public life? We want to define what is 
beautiful and what is ugly in ethical terms. For various societies in various times, dif-
ferent behaviours were and continue to be beautiful and ugly. Our contemporary moral 
imagination may be only a temporal and historical form characteristic of the Western 
civilisation developed after the Second World War. Perhaps in future we will return 
to other moral and ethical concepts in which not the idea of freedom or equality, but 
other ideas, opposed to them, will be the new basis for “objective” morality. How can 
we conclude what kind of human behaviour should be exemplary if we can observe 
in the history of humanity various forms of behaviours, from charity to mass murders 
and even the Holocaust, made several dozen years ago in Western civilisation which, 
formally, draws “inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of 
Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalien-
able rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law.”34 
Only society or political authority decides, referring to its interests and aims, what 
kinds of behaviours may provide to achieve these aims (these actions are then morally 
good) and what behaviours preclude them (they are considered as morally bad). 
For Harris, morality is part of scientific disciplines.35 Science is unable to say 
anything about human morality, as Harris would like.36 If science is about facts and 
32 Sam Harris vs William Lane Craig – The God Debate II, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=nebLvSnS-nc 38:00 [accessed: 08.06.2014].
33 Ibidem, 56:00 [accessed: 19.06.2014].
34 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Preamble, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2012.326.01.0001.01.ENG [accessed: 02.06.2014].
35 S. Harris, The Moral Landscape..., p. 2.
36 Ibidem, p. 25.
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not about norms (in accordance with Hume’s is/ought distinction), how could we 
extract any moral and ethical norms from these observed facts? Science may show 
what kinds of behaviours in chemical, medical, psychological or cultural contexts 
may be used for human life, but these explanations will not say anything about moral 
norms. If the same behaviour were harmful for others, we would say that it is not 
ethical, but we do not have any basis to say that it is not moral, especially if this be-
haviour is a source of happiness for its agent and is compatible with its conscience. 
Knowledge about human welfare does not create moral norms. We know today as 
well as several thousand years ago that man wants happiness and wants to avoid 
suffering. Independently of this knowledge, mankind will realise its aims: social, 
economic, political or psychological and, depending on actual interests, may protect 
or destroy the life of others. The history of mankind is a good example of this con-
ventional and historical nature of moral norms. The state of welfare and happiness 
understood psychologically and physically does not imply moral obligations. What 
should we do if happiness of one requires suffering of other? Today in the European 
Union the value of life is the highest and the most important value, but this is abso-
lutely not the case in the USA, where in some states the death penalty is accepted. 
In this case, a more important value than life is the idea of public order, justice or 
revenge. Similarly, in cases of self-defence we can kill the attacker, deciding that our 
life and happiness, “welfare,” is more important than his welfare. The attacker prob-
ably thinks the same. Society decides that we have rights to freedom and property 
and the right to life. This is not obvious intrinsically, and in the “state of nature,” like 
in the world of animals, the right to life is contractual and the property of the one who 
is stronger, faster craftier. 
Harris claims that the correlation between brain states and real facts enables an in-
dication of false theories.37 Brain states correlated with feelings of goodness, welfare 
or benefits may be caused by different factors. One person is happy as an atheist, and 
another as a theist. The state of happiness and subjective welfare has various causes 
for different people. Moral norms and models were developed by particular groups 
in certain conditions, not by mankind. We cannot compare, as Harris would suggest, 
morality with logics or medicine, because morality refers to a particular idea and 
feeling of welfare and happiness and does not have an objective background to give 
universal criteria and justifications. 
We can say, following Nietzsche, that the law itself does not exist. The law must 
be arbitrarily enacted, and we cannot acknowledge some kinds of behaviours and ac-
tions as morally wrong themselves, because life is also expressed by aggressiveness 
and brutality. In the context of Nietzsche’s moral philosophy, the law is artificial and 
the unnatural limit of the will of power and life.38 In Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s point 
of view, the notion of truth expresses and realises the power.39
37 Ibidem, pp. 187–188.
38 F. Nietzsche, op.cit., p. 82.
39 R. Wolin, The Seduction of Unreason. The Intellectual Romance with Fascism. From Nietzsche to 
Postmodernism, Princeton–Oxford 2004, p. 41.
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Harris repeats the view of the philosophers of the French enlightenment, for whom 
human happiness and suffering were the basis of morality.40 One’s happiness may 
involve suffering of others, and these categories depend on the particular approach. 
In Nietzsche’s deconstruction of morality, the instinct for compassion is needed for 
weak and helpless people, who subjugated morality and made it useful for their awk-
wardness. Perhaps the so-called morally good man is really a bad man, and vice 
versa? Why can we not accept as morally good some values and behaviours which 
we interpret as bad? Maybe these bad human beings express the real or correct form 
of humanity?41 According to Nietzsche, true morality was shaped by the aristocracy, 
whose actions were identified with good. This aristocratic group was not limited by 
moral norms, but they created norms.42 However, the morality of the weak thus de-
stroys the morality of the strong. Morality expresses the human mind and nature, and 
may not be understood as a finished set of norms which must be accepted a priori. If 
we create norms and choose kinds of actions that are the best for us, we do not have 
a basis to think about the universal morality of mankind. 
I think that we cannot give a basis to so-called universal, common and objective 
morality. These attempts, secular as well as religious, express particular points of 
view, actual aims and interests of individuals or groups. Science, which is a new hope 
for Harris’s idea of universal morality, also belongs to this kind of particular explana-
tion. Knowledge about brains does not give advice for moral theory because various 
people feel the same good or bad feelings under different stimuli. This difficulty of 
scientific explanation of morality is, in some sense, similar to the question of qualia 
in cognitive science. We can know everything about brain function and the neuronal 
correlates of, for instance, our sensations of colours, but still we do not know how and 
why the same subjective conscious experiences appear when we see the same kind 
of objects. It is worth recalling Thomas Nagel’s maxim about qualia: “an organism 
has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that 
organism – something it is like for the organism.”43 Regarding morality, perhaps we 
can do neuroimaging and register the functioning of the nervous system, but we could 
probably not derive from this knowledge about neuronal facts any normative claims 
and knowledge about welfare in a moral sense. 
We should also differentiate explanation from justification. Harris speaks about 
explanation. His descriptive explanation does not give a basis for justification of his 
moral postulates. We can create some kinds of ethics, but regarding morality we have 
an irremovable difficulty in defining what kinds of behaviours and actions are stand-
ard and obligatory for man. Maybe every kind of behaviour is natural and “moral” 
if we are part of nature, and every one of our behaviours expresses and realises our 
natural possibilities and potential. I think that this topic is some kind of Kantian an-
tinomy. Maybe we cannot justify philosophically, similarly as in metaphysical and 
epistemological questions, good and evil, and perhaps Haidt and Bjorklund are right 
40 S. Harris, The End of Faith..., pp. 170–171.
41 F. Nietzsche, op.cit., pp. 27–29.
42 Ibidem, p. 35.
43 T. Nagel, What is it like to be a Bat?, “Philosophical Review” 1974, no. 83, p. 436.
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to say, “If you are able to honestly examine the moral arguments in favor of slavery 
and genocide, then you are likely to be either a psychopath or a philosopher.”44
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